Unworking the Sadean Communion by Friedman, Jacob

Unworking the Sadean Communion
Jacob Friedman
Critical Theory and Social Justice, Occidental College, 2010
Abstract: Marquis de Sade’s Philosophy in the Bedroom engages the question of limits—physi-
cal, mental, and moral—through libertine philosophy and the orgy.  Sade’s controversial explo-
ration of human nature, generally marginalized in both philosophy and the academy, deserves 
a re-examination for its ontological utility. I read Philosophy in the Bedroom as an attempt at 
being-in-community as defined by Jean-Luc Nancy in his book, The Inoperative Community. 
Nancy’s radical conceptualization of community is contrary to common notions of the social 
“community.” He argues that true community is something that occurs in the disruption of the 
everyday social and political projects, and it is in this sense that I read Philosophy in the Bed-
room as an attempt at Nancean community. For Nancy, community is an experience that pre-
sents to us the reality of our finitude by a process of mutual exposure to one another at our lim-
its. I argue that Sade makes an attempt to reach these limits and generate community, and al-
though he does not succeed, he points us in the right direction. I apply a critical Nancean lens to 
Sade’s text in order to understand its reasons for failure and to rescue his philosophy from its 
limited context.
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Unworking the Sadean Communion
Jacob Friedman
Marquis de Sade’s Philosophy in the Bedroom1  tells the story of three wealthy libertines—Dol-
mancé, Madame de Saint-Ange, and Le Chevalier—who take in a young virgin girl named 
Eugénie, and in one day teach her all there is to know about libertinage. Dolmancé and Saint-
Ange not only arouse Eugénie’s body with excessive sexual practices, but also stimulate her 
mind with their libertine philosophy. At the beginning of the book, Sade instructs his readers 
to study and imitate the characters of Dolmancé, Saint-Ange, and Eugénie, so I will treat their 
speech and action as his philosophy. Given the radical nature of the book—and all of Sade’s 
work for that matter—and its controversial, “immoral” subject matter, the novel has remained 
mostly in the margins of the fields of literature, philosophy, and theory. This article is, however, 
ultimately not about morality, but ontology.
Viewing the novel through the lens of “community” provides a pathway for new inter-
pretation, meaning, and perhaps even ontological utility. Philosophy in the Bedroom is an at-
tempt at being-in-community as defined in Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Community.2 For 
Nancy, true community is antithetical to all common conceptions of community; in fact, it oc-
curs precisely in their disruption—it is in this sense that Philosophy in the Bedroom can be read 
as a movement toward true community. Furthermore, Sade’s attempt at community is thwarted 
by his problematic understanding  of nature. Sade’s essentialist idea of nature renders his en-
deavor what Nancy calls a “project” or a “work,” which precludes the possibility of true com-
munity. I unwork Sade’s philosophy so that it may become a useful tool in guiding us toward 
being-in-community.
Being-in-Community
Jean-Luc Nancy’s conceptualization of community is an answer to a question that is 
not merely social or political, but is in fact ontological. Nancy seeks to understand not simply 
the social “community” as it is commonly understood, but rather our very being. Nancy’s 
“community” is a response to one of the most fundamental ontological questions—not “what 
are we?” but “how are we?” or “how do we be?” By explicating  the notion of community as a 
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shared exposure of our finitude and contingency, Nancy presents it as “an experience that makes 
us be.”3
True community necessarily involves what Nancy calls “being-in-common” and stands 
in opposition to communion, which involves “common being.” While the former entails multi-
ple beings that retain their singularity and exist together, the latter involves a fusion of beings 
into a single common substance or identity. This self-immanent “common being” has histori-
cally dominated the traditional Western notions of community, which Nancy critiques. These 
notions—which are found in all Western political thought, from communist to democratic to 
(most explicitly) dictatorial—assume an essence of community that unites all of its members 
into a oneness. Nancy argues, “the community that becomes a single thing (body, mind, father-
land, Leader…) necessarily loses the in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or the to-
gether that defines it.”4  This “unicity” occurs when a would-be-community is made into what 
Nancy calls a “work,” “project,” or “operation.”
 Nancy offers gemeinschaft, the Nazi “community,” as an elucidatory example of the 
“work.” This is only the most explicit illustration of the kind of consequences that occur when 
a community is essentialized and made immanent, in this case under the determinative title, 
Aryan. Nancy stresses that “all our political programs imply this work: either as the product of 
the working community, or else the community itself as work.”5  According to Nancy, a “com-
munity” of immanence such as gemeinschaft can ultimately only be a work of death. Whereas 
the struggle for absolute self-immanence would intuitively only entail a death of the other, in 
this case the entire community itself must also be sacrificed:
…the logic of Nazi Germany was not only the extermination of the other…but 
also, effectively, the logic of sacrifice aimed at all those in the “Aryan” commu-
nity who did not satisfy the criteria of pure immanence, so much so that—it be-
ing  obviously impossible to set a limit on such criteria—the suicide of the Ger-
man nation itself might have represented a plausible extrapolation of the proc-
ess: moreover, it would not be false to say that this really took place, with regard 
to certain aspects of the spiritual reality of this nation.6 
Thus, gemeinschaft epitomizes the antithesis of Nancy’s true community and clearly demon-
strates what is at stake in our thinking of community.
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True community cannot be created by society—it is not a calculable project but is 
rather something  that happens to us. “Community is made or is formed by the retreat or by 
the subtraction of something: this something, which would be the fulfilled infinite identity of 
community, is what [Nancy] call[s] its ‘work.’”7  True community happens in the disruption of 
the work, in the disturbance of the everyday order of our normative social and political pro-
jects. It is “the unworking  of work that is social, economic, technical, and institutional,” and it 
is “what happens to us…in the wake of society.”8  When societal norms, traditions, customs, and 
rules are broken and restraints are shattered—this is the time and place of true community.
Sadean Attempt at Community
This last concept serves as a point of departure for reading Sade’s Philosophy in the Bed-
room as an attempt at being-in-community. The general topics of Sade’s writing—sex, perver-
sion, violence, blasphemy—certainly interrupt normalcy and burst out of everyday social con-
straints. In choosing to engage with Sade’s text, readers are themselves creating a rupture in 
conventional social boundaries. Moreover, the characters in Philosophy in the Bedroom exhibit a 
certain obsession with reaching and exceeding  limits. In the very first lines of the book, Saint-
Ange says, “I have discovered that when it is a question of someone like me, born for liber-
tinage, it is useless to think of imposing  limits or restraints upon oneself—impetuous desires 
immediately sweep them away.”9  Limits play a critical role in true community; for Nancy, the 
exposure of our limits is an exposure to our finitude, and this exposure generates true com-
munity. Nancy argues that community cannot happen to individuals, for an individual is iso-
lated and “closed off from all community,” nor can it happen to subjects, for a subject believes 
in its own infinite ego, and community is “resistance…to all the forms and all the violences of 
subjectivity.”10  Rather, community happens to what Nancy calls “singular beings” who exist 
only through their mutual exposure at their limits, to and for other singular beings. This shared 
exposure of the singular beings’ limits, an exposure to contingency, is finitude itself. “Finitude, 
or the lack of infinite identity…is what makes community.”11  Whereas a subject intrinsically 
believes its own ego to be infinite or unlimited, Nancy argues that the exposure of our limits, 
the recognition of our finitude, reveals the reality of our Being: being-in-community.
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In Philosophy in the Bedroom, social norms and regulations represent one type of limit. 
The characters repeatedly refute every single moral or social rule, thus revealing  the “moral” 
framework of the story. Sade completely devalues and rejects the following  ideas: modesty, pi-
ety, empathy, virtue, morality, God, religion, the propagation of the human race, marriage, mo-
nogamy, family, love, and friendship; and he defends and advocates the following: adultery, 
queer sexuality, theft, incest, murder, parricide, infanticide, and rape. The characters’ defense 
for these claims all come back to one fundamental thing: Nature, an essential point I will re-
turn to in later sections. When the characters speak of “those inestimable joys that come of 
bursting  socially imposed restraints and of the violation of every law,” this disruption is framed 
as part of their quest for pleasure; however, it is more than just that.12 I argue that the charac-
ters see these social limits as artificial, and they imagine that beyond these false limits are true 
or “natural” limits. In exceeding all “artificial” limits, the characters seek their “natural” lim-
its—this search is their attempt at community.
The characters’ “natural” limits are manifested in the text in two manners: physically, as 
the limits of the human body (i.e., the skin), and conceptually, as the limits of the possible, or 
in Sade’s terminology, the limits of Nature itself. First, to examine the physical manifestation, I 
turn to the orgies that take place among the characters, which constitute the majority of the 
story’s action. The orgy is the site at which all attention is put on the limits, or ends, of the par-
ticipating  bodies, and these limits are explored and tested in countless ways. In the orgy, the 
limits of the body are pushed beyond just the skin-as-surface to include orifices and lacera-
tions of the skin. In the violence and intercourse of the orgy, the “internal” is pushed into the 
“external” (sperm, blood, etc.) and the external into the internal (penetration).
The violence and sexuality in Philosophy in the Bedroom is never individual—no mastur-
bation or self-mutilation occurs. All of the exploits that we witness occur in the presence of at 
least three people, and the vast majority of them physically involve all of the present characters 
simultaneously. No body part is sacred—the possibilities of what can be used as an orifice are 
fully explored: the mouth, hand, vagina, anus, breasts, armpit. The room in which the events 
take place is lined with mirrors so that “everything is visible, no part of the body can remain 
hidden: everything must be seen.”13 Here we begin to see the parallel between the physical 
exposure of bodily limits in the orgy and the mutual exposure of singular beings at their lim-
its. This idea is further demonstrated in Sade’s language, as when Dolmancé gives Eugénie 
this instruction: “expose the most intimate parts of your body; require of your friends that they 
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do the same.”14  The libertines show an obsession with nudity and the complete exposure of 
the body because the naked body indicates to them our natural—and therefore truest—limits.
Nancy’s community requires multiple singular beings, beings-in-common as opposed 
to common-beings, because it is at the very limits between them where they are mutually ex-
posed to finitude, where they be-in-community. The origin of community “...is the tracing of 
the borders upon which or along which singular beings are exposed.”15 Thus, true community 
happens when one feels or experiences one’s own limits against those of an other. “A singular 
being appears, as finitude itself: at the end (or at the beginning), with the contact of the skin 
(or the heart) of another singular being, at the confines of the same singularity that is, as such 
always other, always shared, always exposed.”16  This mutual tracing of limits certainly occurs 
throughout the orgies, as the bare skin of each character is constantly touching  that of multi-
ple others.
When true community happens, this exposure to the other and to one’s finitude, at 
one’s own ends, leads to a loss of ego, or subjectivity, and an experience of the other. Again, 
community cannot be experienced by subjects, “it is not the space of the egos,” but happens 
rather to singular beings, mutually contingent upon one another.17 In this ego-shattering expe-
rience, the possibility of the autonomous self is destroyed and replaced by a necessary de-
pendence on other beings. At the ultimate limit of the orgy, the orgasm, the participants seem 
to experience such a “death of the subject,” or loss of ego. The characters express the desire to 
be “torn asunder,” and, when reaching their climaxes, their language is that of total 
obliteration.18  Saint-Ange cries, “Good God, I’m dying…It’s done, finished, I cannot go on… 
You’ve ruined me, both of you,” and Eugénie proclaims, “he causes me to die” and “I am 
annihilated.”19 Along with this annihilation of the self comes the revealing of a dependence on 
the other. Eugénie exclaims, “I cannot bear it any more! oh, I’m dying! Don’t abandon me, 
dear friends, I am about to swoon…I am dead, exhausted.”20 And further, they exhibit a giving 
over of oneself, a self-abandonment for the other: “Oh, ‘twill kill me, I’m sure of it, ‘tis inevita-
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ble… Go on, penetrate, my dear, I abandon myself to you.”21 Nancy describes this annihilation 
or death of the subject into community:
The motif of the revelation, through death, of being-together or being-with, and 
of the crystallization of the community around death of its members, that is to 
say around the “loss” (the impossibility) of their immanence…leads to a space of 
thinking incommensurable with the problematics of sociality or intersubjectiv-
ity. 22
Significantly, the annihilation of the characters is not self-inflicted suicide, but always in rela-
tion to an other, or multiple others, following  Nancy’s statement: “Community is revealed in 
the death of others; hence it is always revealed to others. Community is what takes place 
through others and for others.”23 
This notion of the death of the other—in which a death is felt by beings and reveals 
their mutual contingency—stands in opposition to the death mentioned earlier, that of suici-
dal extermination towards immanence, as in gemeinschaft, in which the death of the other 
(Jews, etc.) is not experienced or felt at all (by the Nazis). Each character, despite their claims to 
the contrary, expresses great concern for the pleasure and orgasm, which is to say death, of the 
others. Considering  the mutual exposure and touching of bodily limits, and the subsequent 
loss of subjectivity in relation with the other, the orgy can be understood as a physical mani-
festation of an attempt at being-in-community.
The characters also seek their “natural” limits conceptually, and in doing  so they shat-
ter all social and moral limitations so as not to be restricted in their quest. In effect, their im-
plicit definition of Nature becomes, essentially, deviance or Evil. In their rejections of common 
(or Christian) morality, they constantly refer to animals, beasts, and the “savage” man. Dol-
mancé says, “Cruelty is stamped in animals, in whom, as I think I have said, Nature’s laws are 
more emphatically to be read than in ourselves; cruelty exists among savages, so much nearer 
to Nature than civilized men are.”24 In trying  to define not only Nature, but our nature or hu-
man nature, the characters revert back to animality, dismissing  civility and morality as trivial, 
man-made limitations. Consequently, “Nature” becomes the excuse for a lack of consciousness 
or empathy, which allows for Evil.
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Citing  the continuous cycle of growth and destruction, of life and death, which occurs 
in Nature, Dolmancé defends the act of murder. Based on the idea that life comes out of death, 
he argues that the murderer simply “alters forms…gives back to Nature the elements whereof 
the hand of this skilled artisan instantly recreates other beings.”25 Further, he claims that the 
extermination of the entire human race would, “by returning  to Nature the creative faculty she 
has entrusted to us, reinvigorate her…she would have again that energy we deprive her of by 
propagating  our own selves.”26 Thus, the act of murder is not only defended, but advocated as 
giving “Nature a pleasure most agreeable.”27  All the other vices—theft, adultery, infanticide, 
rape—are similarly advocated because they exist in Nature, and are therefore in accord with 
“Nature’s mandates.” 28  Thus Sade’s characters equate striving  towards Evil with striving to-
wards the “Natural.”
In the Sadean universe, the thorough conceptual exploration of all possibilities of de-
viance is a quest for the limits of Nature itself, for the limits of our Natural being. This idea is 
suggested in Dolmancé’s statement to Eugénie: 
…everything libertinage suggests is also a natural inspiration; the most extraor-
dinary, the most bizarre acts, those which most arrantly seem to conflict with 
every law, every human institution…well, Eugénie, even those are not frightful, 
and there is not one amongst them that cannot be demonstrated within the 
boundaries of Nature.29 
Dolmancé specifies that although we can go against all the laws of man, we are ultimately con-
fined within the “boundaries of Nature”—thus, the limits of Nature are our truest limits. Since 
human law (i.e., morality) restricts our behavior to what is Good, the characters seek what is 
Evil in order to escape our false limits and find our true limits. However, just as there is no ac-
cessing absolute Good, there is no way to attain the essence of absolute Evil, or of Nature, or 
further, of human Nature. This sentiment is apparent in Dolmancé’s language:
it is impossible for man to commit a crime; when Nature inculcated in him the 
irresistible desire to commit crime, she most prudently arranged to put beyond 
his reach those acts which could disturb the operations or conflict with her will. 
http://scholar.oxy.edu/ctsj     8 of 19        Jacob Friedman
25 Sade 43.
26 Sade 44.
27 Sade 43.
28 Sade 73.
29 Sade 72.
Ha, my friend, be sure that all the rest is entirely permitted, and that she has 
not been so idiotic as to give us the power of discomforting  her or of disturbing 
her workings.30 
The unattainable condition of the essence of Evil or Nature leaves the characters reaching 
“toward the inconceivable,” and “beyond the possible” in search of their true limits.31 
Immanent Communion
Though Sade’s characters make an attempt at community, they are ultimately pre-
vented from obtaining true community. I argue that the characters in fact make a project out 
of their community by employing  a structure of immanence, corresponding to Nancy’s notion 
of immanent communion. Communion is a project or work of immanence—it is the denial of 
finitude through “fusion into a body, into a unique and ultimate identity that would no longer 
be exposed.”32  This fusion into an immanent unicity, into an infinite identity or Subject, in-
volves a repression or sublation of difference or otherness, an erasure of limits between be-
ings. “The subject cannot be outside itself: this is even what ultimately defines it—that its out-
side and all its ‘alienations’ or ‘extraneousness’ should in the end be suppressed and sublated 
by it. It is altogether different with the being  of communication.”33  This unification into a 
higher Subject involves an objectification of the other, an appropriation of alterity. This fusion 
into a single identity is appealing because it suppresses both the anxiety of finitude and the 
instability of contingent being. However, as finite creatures, our very Being is a being-finite, 
and therefore to deny our finitude is in a sense to not be.
This immanence is manifested in Philosophy in the Bedroom in two somewhat distinct 
manners: physically, in an enclosed spatio-temporal realm, and conceptually, in the characters’ 
assumption of a single identity or essence. Like many of Sade’s works, the physical setting  of 
the story is a fixed realm within which the characters remain isolated from the outside world. 
The story takes place in the “delightful boudoir” of Saint-Ange’s estate.34  Although it is not 
specified, we can imagine from the descriptions of servants, gardens, and the fact that “one 
could slaughter a steer in this chamber without any risk of having his bellowings overheard,” 
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that this estate is a private, isolated palatial manor.35 French literary critic Pierre Macherey of-
fers an analysis of this spatial element in Sade’s One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom that is 
equally relevant to Philosophy in the Bedroom. The former novel sets up a “social utopia” that is 
isolated from real societies and their social and moral norms:
Once all the bridges have been cut, the unchained—in every sense of the 
word—passions establish a new order…The requisite precondition for the 
enunciation of this law of desire is the total isolation that can be achieved 
within the limits of an inaccessible spot. Total isolation both provokes the ex-
plosion of the drives and contains their effusions, rather as though desire can 
be fully satisfied only if it is circumscribed within the closure of a pure “in-
itself”… It is an inside with no outside, and one can neither leave it nor enter it, 
for the very idea of communication has been abolished, as has the idea of any 
exchange with that which escapes its order.36 
The language of immanence is unmistakable—the isolation and closure of an “inside with no 
outside,” “a pure ‘in-itself,’” are exactly the elements Nancy points out in communion. Moreo-
ver, the lack of exchange or communication with any alterity that Macherey refers to is pre-
cisely Nancy’s critique of the self-immanent unity that is “no longer exposed.”37 Sade’s choice 
of setting for Philosophy in the Bedroom reflects the desire for a self-governed, non-contingent 
spatio-temporal realm reserved exclusively for libertinage. 
The word exclusive should be taken literally, for the limits of this realm are explicitly 
marked by the exclusion of Eugénie’s mother, Madame de Mistival, who comes to “save” Eugé-
nie. Upon her unannounced arrival, Dolmancé threatens to “pitch [her] out of the window.”38 
Even before her arrival, the libertines get a message from Eugénie’s father warning them of 
Mme de Mistival’s intentions to take Eugénie away, and they calculate how they will treat her, 
already precluding the possibility of true communication. They proceed to converse with her 
using either the utmost sarcasm and irony or gross vulgarity, both of which keep a distance or 
separation between her and them—their speech does not amount to communication.
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Before telling  her to “get out” and sending her off the property, they physically treat 
her in such a way that an uninformed onlooker might even mistake her for one of them.39 
They undress her, engage in various sexual acts with her, and use the same sex toys and weap-
ons on her that they use on one another, although much more ruthlessly. Of course, she re-
sists, but were she to “give in” and start to enjoy the proceedings—if she allowed herself to be 
assimilated—they would undoubtedly welcome her into their realm of libertinage. Their 
treatment of Mme de Mistival appears to be an attempt to absorb her into their realm, but, 
since she refuses to assimilate, they throw her off the property, eliminating difference within 
their realm of self-immanence.
Emmanuel Levinas explains this assimilatory posture in a critique of immanence that 
closely parallels Nancy’s.40 In Levinas’s view, all of Western thought has as its project the com-
prehension and absorption of alterity through knowledge. In this system of thought, every 
movement toward the other inevitably leads to a return to the self with an appropriation of the 
other—in this gesture the self retains and secures its own selfhood. Bringing  the transcenden-
tal into immanence, and the other into the self, Western thinkers effectively totalize the world 
into a unicity. Levinas critiques this philosophical tradition, arguing that it renders impossible 
any authentic experience of the other. Nancy reflects an equivalent sentiment: “immanence, if 
it were to come about, would instantly suppress community, or communication, as such.”41 In-
deed, communication requires more than one being, and Nancy shares Levinas’s concern for 
the preservation of the other’s alterity. On the relation between singular beings, Nancy says, 
“We are alike because each one of us is exposed to the outside…. The like is not the same. I do 
not rediscover myself, nor do I recognize myself in the other: I experience the other’s 
alterity….”42  The preservation of the other, in its absolute otherness, is vital to experiencing 
and communicating with it. Yet Sade’s characters, in their project of immanence, deny alterity 
and create communion, preventing communication and true community.
In contrast to Mme de Mistival’s exclusion, from the beginning of the book Saint-Ange 
assimilates Eugénie into the libertine sphere. This inclusion is apparent not only physical-
ly—as she brings Eugénie into her home—but also conceptually. Just as the expulsion of Mme 
de Mistival emphasizes the self-containment of the libertine communion, so the integrative 
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language of Saint-Ange suggests Nancy’s notion of the subject’s objectification of the other, as 
well as the Levinasian notions of subsumption and assimilation into immanence. Eugénie is 
certainly an “other” in many ways at the start of the book—she is a virgin who was raised 
“properly” by a strict, pious mother. When Le Chevalier inquires about Eugénie, Saint-Ange 
says, “I should in vain undertake to figure her to you; she is quite beyond my descriptive pow-
ers…satisfy yourself with the knowledge that assuredly neither you nor I have ever set eyes on 
anything  so delicious, anywhere.”43 This declaration displays an objectifying posture and em-
phasizes the fact that Eugénie is an unknown other, soon to be assimilated into the known.
Moreover, Saint-Ange calls Eugénie “the sweet innocent I am luring  into our nets,” 
and, when Dolmancé first tries to have sex with Eugénie, Saint-Ange stops him and says, 
“Eugénie belongs to me only,” but promises her to him as a reward after their lesson is 
finished.44 Saint-Ange’s consumptive, objectifying attitude, which marks their effort as a pro-
ject of communion, is embodied in her exclamation, “Eugénie, let me kiss thee, let me eat thee! 
let me consume, batten upon thy fuck….”45 Saint-Ange’s language regarding Eugénie’s father 
is equally telling: “Her father is a libertine—I’ve enthralled him,” and “Have no fears. I have 
seduced the father…he’s mine. I must confess to you, I surrendered myself to him in order to 
close his eyes: he knows nothing  of my designs, and will never dare to scan them…I have 
him.”46  Here, she again exemplifies Nancy’s communion; by having  sex with Eugénie’s father, 
she brings him so close to herself that he is completely absorbed into her self-
immanence—she consumes his otherness. This possessive act of absorption closes his eyes; 
the two of them become one so that he can no longer see her—communication is thwarted by 
unicity.
Nature in “Philosophy in the Bedroom”
While the physical setting  of the book functions as a realm of immanence and Saint-
Ange’s assimilatory attitude towards Eugénie further marks their endeavor as a project of 
communion, perhaps what most characterizes the libertines’ effort as a work is their unifica-
tion into a single, essential identity. This identity is none other than “Nature,” the characters’ 
justification for and foundation of all their deviant activities. They look to animals and “savage” 
man for guidance on behavior that is “Natural,” which in turn determines their own “nature.” 
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They employ a markedly false logic in their understanding of nature, and underlying  this mis-
take is an even more fundamental one: they assign to nature an essence, and in doing  so effec-
tively make a project out of their Natural endeavors, i.e., the orgy—their attempt at community.
Picking and choosing the occurrences in nature which go against societal values, the 
characters privilege, and even exclusively use, these ideas in their implicit definition of Nature. 
This skewed logic in which they decide what is Natural and what is not renders their idea of 
Nature anything  but natural. It allows them to say things like, “The most natural thing  in the 
world: I am going to depilate her and lacerate her thighs with pincers.”47 And further, this phi-
losophy allows them to impose and regulate a hierarchy of value within Nature: “…never listen 
to your heart, my child; it is the most untrustworthy guide we have received from Nature.”48 
Because Sade’s characters believe in a hierarchical spectrum of what is most “truly” natural 
even within their idea of Nature, inevitably there can be no identifiable or essential distinction 
between the natural and the unnatural.
Somewhat paradoxically, Nature is both deified and rationalized. Nature takes the place 
of God in the text—her workings are “sacred” and “…she alone, by reason of her energy, is 
able to create, produce, preserve, maintain, hold in equilibrium within the immense plains of 
space all the spheres that stand before our gaze.”49 And, because the pursuit of pleasure is the 
most Natural instinct humans have, the deification is quite literal when Dolmancé says to 
Eugénie, “abandon all your senses to pleasure, let it be the one object, the one god, of your 
existence; it is to this god a girl ought to sacrifice everything, and in her eyes, nothing must be 
as holy as pleasure.”50 Nature is apotheosized as the creator, maintainer, and essence of every-
thing. Yet it is also heavily rationalized, as illustrated by the references to Nature’s “irresistible 
schemes,” “operations,” “mandates,” and “dictates.”51 This language evokes Nancy’s “work,” and 
we can apply his critique of the communion and its work to the operative project that the 
characters carry out under the name of Nature.
Indeed, “Nature” is not only deified, rationalized, and essentialized but also Subjecti-
fied; satisfying  another criterion of Nancy’s communion, it is the “Subject of their fusion.”52 
Saint-Ange speaks of Nature as of a deified Subject, using  language of respect and loyalty: “…
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let us be certain indeed that this species of disorders, to whatever extreme we carry them, far 
from outraging  Nature, is but a sincere homage we render her; it is to obey her laws to cede to 
the desires she alone has placed in us; it is only in resisting  her that we affront her.”53  They 
must respect Nature by pursuing their own pleasure in deviance, and they must never offend 
her by denying themselves pleasure, for that would “conflict with her will.”54 The identities of 
the characters are fused into the larger Subject of Nature—their wills become her will—she 
determines their “nature” and bears the responsibility of their actions. Hence, Saint-Ange de-
clares that Nature gives them their purpose: “…a woman…must never have for objective, oc-
cupation, or desire anything save to have herself fucked from morning to night: ‘tis for this 
unique end Nature created her.”55 Nature unifies the characters under a single identity, elimi-
nating the “in” of being-in-common.
This previous quotation can now be read in a new, more telling light:
…in libertinage, nothing is frightful, because everything  libertinage suggests is 
also a natural inspiration; the most extraordinary, the most bizarre acts, those 
which most arrantly seem to conflict with every law, every human institu-
tion…well, Eugénie, even those are not frightful, and there is not one amongst 
them that cannot be demonstrated within the boundaries of Nature.56 
These “boundaries of Nature,” which they seek as their own “true” limits, are in fact of their 
own invention, and they are neither true nor natural. This essentialized idea of Nature, which 
gives them their purpose, determines their will, and unifies their being(s), deprives each of 
them of their singularity and prevents them from experiencing  one another’s alterity. Func-
tioning  as what Nancy calls the “fulfilled infinite identity of community,” it precludes, by mak-
ing  a work out of their “community,” the possibility of the characters exposing  their true limits 
and experiencing their finitude.57 
The “working” or “operational” manner of the orgies is quite apparent in the language 
of the text itself. In fact, throughout the book the orgy is referred to as an “operation” three 
times and as a “project” three times. Rather than a chaotic free-for-all, every act in the Sadean 
orgy is carefully calculated and arranged before it takes place. As Saint-Ange says, “If you 
please, let us put a little order in these revels; measure is required even in the depths of in-
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famy and delirium.”58  Dolmancé plans each sexual operation to an excessive degree—he in-
structs the others on every detail of their physical positioning, the timing of every act, and the 
manner in which the acts are carried out.
Multiple Texts within “Philosophy in the Bedroom”
A fair question is how a group of people (or an author) who stringently oppose the 
ideas of morality, empathy, friendship, and love, and who promote theft, murder, and rape 
could possibly be trying  to generate community. The answer is found within the multiplici-
ty—or better yet, the duplicity—of texts that are available within the book. These multiple texts 
expose themselves through incongruities within the speech and action of the characters. To 
begin with, Dolmancé verbally rejects one of the most fundamental rules of our morality: “Tis 
a very false tone you use when you speak to us of this Nature which you interpret as telling  us 
not to do to others what we would not have done to us.”59  He goes on to explain that this 
guideline is totally absent from Nature and should therefore be absent from human behavior. 
But his actions say otherwise—when he is beating Eugénie’s mother he says, “Augustin… give 
me back the blows I am going to strike this stricken lady.”60  Dolmancé literally has done to 
him what he is doing  to another. Further, he says, “I ask but one favor of Eugénie: that she 
consent to be flogged as vigorously as I myself desire to be; you notice how well within natural 
law I am.”61 In absolute contradiction to his previous statement, he actually situates the “do 
unto others” code within Nature and embodies it in his actions.
In a similar example, Dolmancé attempts to destabilize morality by explaining  the im-
possibility of empathic relations: 
…there is no possible comparison between what others experience and what we 
sense; the heaviest dose of agony in others ought, assuredly, to be as naught to 
us, and the faintest quickening of pleasure, registered in us, does touch us; 
therefore, we should, at whatever price, prefer this minor excitation which en-
chants us, to the immense sum of others’ miseries, which cannot affect us.62 
He claims that he cannot be influenced by others’ feelings because it is impossible to ever 
know what another person is experiencing; thus, he thinks empathy is an absurd idea. How-
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ever, in explaining his sadistic tastes, Dolmancé inadvertently contradicts this very claim: 
“Pleasure’s effects, in women, are always uncertain; often disappointing… hence, pain must be 
preferred, for pain’s effects cannot deceive, and its vibrations are more powerful.”63 While this 
instance does not display sympathy, it does show empathy—Dolmancé expresses his recogni-
tion of the feelings of an other with the statement, “pain’s effects cannot deceive.” 
Nevertheless, Dolmancé insists that his quest for pleasure is entirely egoistic and that 
he does not care in the least for the pleasure of others: “’Tis false … to say there is pleasure in 
affording  pleasure to others; that is to serve them, and the man who is erect is far from desir-
ing  to be useful to anyone.”64 However, during  the orgies, Dolmancé again contradicts his own 
statement. He says, “…the major object, so it appears to me, is that I discharge the while giving 
this charming  girl all possible pleasure,” and, “Do I frig you well, libertine?...Eugénie, dis-
charge, my angel, yes discharge!”65 Not only does he express his acknowledgement of the oth-
ers’ feelings, he actually wants to gives them pleasure. In fact, throughout the story Dolmancé 
repeatedly insists on the simultaneous orgasms of all the characters. He exclaims, “All of us, 
let’s discharge together!...I expire! Ah, in my life never have I come more voluptuously!” and, 
“Oh, my friends, let us not discharge but in unison: ‘tis life’s single pleasure!”66 In complete 
opposition to his previous claim, in this last line he successfully affirms the values of friend-
ship, empathy, and kindness toward others. Dolmancé reveals that his greatest happiness actu-
ally requires not just the pleasure of others, but giving this pleasure to others.
Sade’s text provides an abundance of evidence suggesting this kind of selfless care for 
others. The characters constantly refer to one another using endearing  terms such as “dear 
heart,” “my angel,” “my darling,” “my friend,” and “my love.”67 Their language continually af-
firms the very ideas of friendship and love that they claim to reject. Further, Dolmancé makes 
this particularly uncharacteristic statement in one of their discussions about excessive cruelty:
Such excesses, perfectly simple and very intelligible to me, doubtless, all the 
same ought never be committed amongst ourselves: “Wolves are safe in their 
own company,” as the proverb has it, and trivial though it may be, ‘tis true. My 
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friends, dread nothing  from me, ever: I’ll perhaps have you do much that is evil, 
but never will I do any to you.68 
Dolmancé establishes friendship, safety, trust, and empathy—this certainly does not seem to 
be a “Natural” environment in the way Sade would have us understand it. Notably, by includ-
ing  only the characters present and excluding everyone in the outside world, Dolmancé pro-
duces and delimits a realm of safety and immanence. Those who are within this realm can be 
trusted, and in this space (and time) all things may be carried out without fear of reprehen-
sion, provided one is a libertine.
The characters’ pursuit of community in the orgy is undermined because they instead 
create a work. Recall that the immanence of the physical setting  precludes the possibility of 
communication to any “outside”; the objectifying posture and assimilatory action of the char-
acters, particularly of Saint-Ange, bring them into a unicity, preventing  communication 
amongst themselves and removing the in of being-in-community. They essentialize and Sub-
jectify “Nature,” allowing  for the fusion of their wills into her “will,” and the fusion of their 
identities into “Nature” as a higher Subject. In the end, all these elements demonstrate that 
their attempt at community in the orgy is thwarted by their making  a work of it, and this is 
further confirmed in the very language of the text itself. The Sadean orgy points towards 
being-in-community, yet it requires a fundamental refiguration if it is to become a useful onto-
logical tool for experiencing true community.
Unworking the Sadean Communion
To realize a redemptive re-reading  of Sade’s marginalized philosophy, it must be liber-
ated from the determinatively essentialist context from which it comes. The philosophical sub-
jects presented—sexuality, religion, morality, love—are perhaps the most sensitive topics in 
human life. Historically, these topics have been responsible for incredibly violent conflict, yet 
at the same time they are constitutive of the most intimate relations between people. In this 
sense, these philosophical subjects comprise much of what we would call our limits. 
I posit that the issues that define our limits push people away from each other only 
when the limits are established and fixed in advance—in other words, when they are essential-
ized. When a limit is thus predetermined, it is impossible for it to meet another limit in any 
harmonious manner and can only result in it clashing  with or rejecting  other limits that it en-
counters. The only way an essentialized limit could possibly cohere with another would be if 
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the two were identical—and since it is impossible for two distinct beings to have identical es-
sences, their relationship would be one of self-to-self, immanence and unicity. Therefore, we 
cannot calculate and predetermine our limits—we do not determine them at all; rather, they 
must be discovered in relation to an other, when we are in community. 
Rarely do philosophers thoroughly engage the sensitive topics taken up in Philosophy in 
the Bedroom because they are “personal,” i.e., they relate to “me” and not to anybody else. Thus 
the limits that relate to these topics can remain secure and fixed, not contingent upon others 
because they are not exposed. However, when these topics are genuinely explored between 
people, our true limits are exposed, and we experience the intimacy of being-in-community. 
Sade points us in this direction by pushing  social and moral limits and searching for our most 
intimate limits. The general hesitancy to explore these topics, and our limits, is undoubtedly 
due to the necessary instability of the loss, or even just the suspension, of our subjectivity, our 
ego, our identity. This instability is the very contingency of our being that surfaces when we 
allow ourselves to be defined, or de-limited, by the limits between ourselves and another being. 
This is what it means to be-in-community: to allow our being  to be entirely determined by our 
relation to an other, so that our limits are unmade and remade at each moment, never fixed 
and never complete. And if Nancy is right, this release of the self into the flux of contingency 
in the face of an Other is our very Being.
By reading Philosophy in the Bedroom as an attempt at being-in-community and reveal-
ing  precisely the ways in which it fails, I have made it possible to mend Sade’s essentialist er-
rors and rescue some of the philosophical content from its limited origins. Having seen the 
way in which immanent communion and essence in the text suppress the efforts towards 
genuine community, it is now possible to unwork and de-essentialize the text so that it is 
opened up to new interpretations and a path is cleared to give it new meaning. Without the 
false essence of nature as its foundation, it will be possible for much of the philosophy to take 
on quite different meanings, and hopefully, the limits of the text will be set in motion.
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